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INTRODUCTION
Thirty years ago in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. LopezMendoza, the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule is inapplicable in immigration proceedings because of
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the civil nature of those proceedings. 1 But a problem exists with that
holding: unconstitutionally seized evidence may still form the basis
for deportation, though that same evidence would be excluded in a
criminal proceeding. Consider the case of Jeanini Almeida-Amaral, a
Brazilian national whom police stopped and immediately arrested after he walked into a gas station parking lot and presented a Brazilian
2
passport after police asked for identification. Consider also Jorge
Angel Puc-Ruiz, a Mexican national who was arrested after producing
a valid state driver’s license when police entered a restaurant and
3
proceeded to request identification from patrons. In both of these
examples, any evidence gathered would be excluded in the criminal
4
context. And, although the Court has repeatedly found that Fourth
Amendment principles must at least minimally apply in the enforce5
ment of immigration statutes and regulations, the majority holding
in Lopez-Mendoza results in the introduction of unconstitutionally
seized evidence in immigration proceedings.
In rejecting application of the exclusionary rule in immigration
proceedings, the Court utilized the balancing test laid out in United
States v. Janis, which requires weighing the social costs of applying the
6
rule against the rule’s likely deterrent effect. When addressing immigration cases, the Supreme Court often walks a fine line between
recognizing the specialized needs of immigration officers to stem the
growing tide of immigration-related offenses and protecting constitu7
tional rights of both aliens and citizens. In Lopez-Mendoza, the Court

1

2
3

4

5
6
7

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984). It should be noted here that there
are strong arguments that the underpinnings of the Court’s decision were incorrect, and
thus the entire decision should be revisited. Elizabeth A. Rossi, Revisiting INS v. LopezMendoza: Why the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule Should Apply in Deportation Proceedings, 44 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 477 (2013).
Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 232 (2d Cir. 2006).
Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d 771, 775 (8th Cir. 2010). Days after the arrest, Puc-Ruiz received a ticket from the police claiming he violated a liquor license. However, the charge
was dropped and the arrest was expunged for being based on false information and for a
lack of probable cause. Id. at 776.
In Almeida-Amaral, the court specifically held that the facts surrounding the stop did not
provide articulable suspicion for a stop and was a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
461 F.3d at 236. The court in Puc-Ruiz was less definitive and did not make a specific decision on a basic Fourth Amendment violation. However the underlying criminal action
was dropped and record expunged by the municipal court based on a failure to provide
evidence of probable cause for the arrest. 629 F.3d at 776.
See infra Part II.B.
428 U.S. 433, 448–50 (1976).
See infra Part II.B for a discussion of several cases in which the Supreme Court noted the
ever-growing problem of unlawful immigration and the need to allow for questioning of
aliens outside of the typical Fourth Amendment constructs.
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held that these social costs outweighed any deterrent value. 8 In general, the Court relied heavily on three factors: (1) a lack of the rule’s
deterrent value in the context of what should be a simplistic immigration proceeding; (2) the intrasovereign nature of the immigration
enforcement system; and (3) the vast numbers of arrests made by en9
forcement agents in a given year.
Despite the decision’s rigid approach, the blanket prohibition of
the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings has not produced a
10
Instead, Part V of the opinion
clear-cut rule for lower courts.
(joined by four of the five majority opinion Justices), which created a
potential exception for violations that are “egregious” or in instances
11
of widespread violations, has produced unequal application results
12
throughout the circuits. Indeed, some circuits have held that the
rule may be inapplicable, while another found that the “egregiousness” standard is met simply by a Fourth Amendment violation accompanied by “conduct a reasonable officer should have known
13
would violate the Constitution.”
But consider how much has changed about the Lopez-Mendoza factors since 1984. First, with regard to immigration law’s complexity,
Congress has approved of at least two major pieces of legislation,
along with hundreds of seemingly minor changes, since the Court’s
14
decision in 1984. Initially, the structure of judicial proceedings was
changed when Congress folded the traditional “exclusion” and “deportation” proceedings into a unified system labeled “removal proceedings,” which resulted in a uniform application of procedural re8
9
10

11
12

13

14

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050.
Id. at 1043–50.
The majority opinion consisted of parts I–IV, and was issued by Justice Sandra Day
O’Connor, and joined by four other Justices (Chief Justice Warren Burger, and Justices
Harry Blackmun, Lewis F. Powell, and William Rehnquist). Id. at 1033. Justice O’Connor
also delivered an opinion in Part V, for which three other Justices joined (Justices
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist). Id.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51.
See Motions to Suppress in Removal Proceedings: A General Overview, AM. IMMIGR.
COUNCIL, 1, 6–12, http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/motions_to_
suppress_in_removal_proceedings-_a_general_overview_1-26-15_fin.pdf (last updated
Jan. 26, 2015) (reviewing the varying stances of the circuit courts regarding exceptions to
the prohibition).
Lopez-Rodriguez v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 1012, 1016 (9th Cir. 2008). For a full discussion of
how the various circuits have addressed the exception, see infra notes 201–17 and accompanying text.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Pub. L.
104–208, 110 Stat. 3009–546. IIRIRA was passed simultaneously with the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214. Jointly, these
two statutes changed everything from criminal sanctions, grounds for deportation, and
the judicial system.
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quirements. 15 In addition, the substantive aspects of removal proceedings have been altered: For example, the legal analysis surrounding both the grounds for removal as well as the forms of relief
16
requested has grown increasingly complex.
Enforcement of immigration violations has also changed dramatically since the inception of what is now termed the “287(g) program,”
which allows for enforcement of federal immigration laws by local
17
and state law enforcement agencies. By delegating enforcement responsibility to state and local agencies, the federal enforcement arm
of immigration has lost traditional control over training and disci18
pline. That modern problem contradicts the Lopez-Mendoza Court’s
focus on unified enforcement as a basis to exclude the exclusionary
19
rule from immigration proceedings.
These two changes together—the nature of immigration proceedings and increased enforcement possibilities—have also increased the
deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in more subtle ways. In LopezMendoza, the Court focused on the ratio of arrests to agents as the system existed in 1984, concluding that, at best, only twelve out of 500

15

16

17

18

19

The new proceedings are described in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of
1965 § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(a) (2012). One issue highlighted by the Board of Immigration Appeals was the substantive and procedural rights disparity between the traditional
exclusion/deportation proceedings, which resulted in an “entry doctrine” that amounted
to increased rights for individuals that entered without inspection versus those that entered “lawfully.” In re Romalez-Alcaide, 23 I&N Dec. 423, 442 (BIA 2002).
For an example of how forms of relief have been complicated, the REAL ID Act offers a
prime example in the increased burden of proof, and credibility determination scheme
laid out in INA § 208(b)(3) of the asylum statutes. REAL ID ACT of 2005, Pub. L. 109–
13, 119 Stat. 203; see also Jennifer Lee Koh, Rethinking Removability, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1803
(2013).
Section 287(g) was added to INA through IIRIRA in 1996. Section 287(g) explicitly allows the federal government to “enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perform a function
of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of
aliens in the United States . . . may carry out such function at the expense of the State or
political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law.” INA §
287(g)(1). Despite the existence of this statute for several years, the first agreement was
not created until 2002. Randy Capps et al., Delegation and Divergence: A Study of 287(g) State
and Local Immigration Enforcement, MIGRATION POLICY INST. 9 (Jan. 2011).
Several reports have criticized oversight protocols of the program, including an internal
report of the Department of Homeland Security. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE
OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OIG-10-63, THE PERFORMANCE OF 287(G) AGREEMENTS (Mar.
2010), available at http:// www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_10-63_Mar10.pdf.
The Court focused on the INS’s “comprehensive scheme for deterring Fourth Amendment violations” including training, investigation, and punishment as “perhaps [the]
most important” factor in diluting the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044–45 (1984).
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arrests per year would even end up in immigration proceedings (the
20
Of those, said the
rest would be deported without a hearing).
21
Court, few would ever raise a Fourth Amendment claim. But the ratio of agents to arrests has significantly decreased because of unified
immigration proceedings, more individuals exercising their right to a
22
removal hearing, and the addition of 287(g) programs.
The exclusionary rule has developed similarly in both the criminal
and immigration contexts. At the time of Lopez-Mendoza, the Court
was also balancing the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary
23
rule in the criminal context in United States v. Leon. In Leon, the
Court held that the exclusionary rule should not apply if a Fourth
Amendment violation occurs when an officer acted in reasonable re24
liance on a mistake by a neutral magistrate. Leon was the first of
many cases that began to chip away at the application of the exclu25
In Herring v. United States, a majority of the Court
sionary rule.
summarized the exclusionary rule application as “serv[ing] to deter
deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circum26
stances recurring or systemic negligence.” Finally, in Davis v. United
States, the Court further weakened the exclusionary rule by requiring
20
21
22
23
24

25

26

Id. at 1044.
Id.
See infra Part III.2.C for a discussion of the impact of the increase in numbers of Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents, 287(g) agents, and the numbers of arrests.
468 U.S. 897, 909 (1984).
Id. at 922. In the companion case of Massachusetts v. Sheppard, the Court held that a similar good faith exception applied when an officer reasonably relied on a warrant issued by
a neutral magistrate although the warrant was later found to be defective. 468 U.S. 981,
988 (1984).
Shortly after these cases, the Court held that warrantless searches based on legislation
later found to be unconstitutional would not have sufficient deterrence of misconduct to
justify use of the exclusionary rule. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 353 (1987). Again in
1995, the Court used the reasoning from Leon to hold that an error by a court clerk that
led to an arrest based on a faulty outstanding warrant (resulting in what amounted to a
warrantless arrest) would similarly not have a sufficient deterrent effect. Arizona v. Evans,
514 U.S. 1, 14 (1995). In a more recent case, the Court used the social cost/deterrent effect balancing test in a more expansive situation; rather than citing to a lack of deterrence because of an error, the Court held that a constitutional violation in the manner of
executing a warrant (failure to the knock-and-announce requirement) would lack sufficient deterrence to justify the suppression of evidence. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S.
586, 595 (2006). In general, there are various ways in which the Fourth Amendment has
lost force, including exceptions to situations in which a violation would occur, as well as
exceptions to when the exclusionary rule should apply. This Article will focus mainly on
the latter. Although the precise reason for the erosion of the exclusionary rule is up for
debate, there is no question that the number of exceptions developed in recent decades
has removed much of the exclusionary rule’s bite. Christopher Slobogin, The Exclusionary
Rule: Is It On Its Way Out? Should It Be?, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 341 (2013).
555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009).
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courts to look at whether the Fourth Amendment violation occurred
because law enforcement acted “deliberately, recklessly, or with gross
27
negligence.” In his dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer summarily suggested that the case law trend is moving toward a Fourth Amendment
that protects only against “those searches and seizures that are egre28
giously unreasonable.”
In light of the significant changes surrounding the exclusionary
rule in both the criminal and immigration contexts, this Article
makes two arguments. First, the factors related to legal complexity,
enforcement, and ratio of agents to arrestees have changed to such a
degree that the Court should re-examine whether to apply the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings. Second, because the development of exclusionary rule case law in the criminal and immigration
context has, in application, been converging towards a similar theme
of requiring a level of egregiousness, the Court should apply the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings precisely as it is already
applied in criminal courts.
Part I discusses the analysis used in the Lopez-Mendoza decision.
Part II considers the current state of the law, and argues that the
three Lopez-Mendoza factors have significantly changed in the intervening years since the Supreme Court’s original decision. Finally,
Part III contends that the evolution of the exclusionary rule in both
the immigration and criminal contexts is so similar that, assuming
application of the exclusionary rule is appropriate in immigration
proceedings, its application should follow the road already paved by
its criminal counterpart.
I. LOPEZ-MENDOZA – APPLYING THE JANIS TEST IN IMMIGRATION COURT
In 1984, the Supreme Court took up the question of whether an
individual in civil immigration removal proceedings should be afforded the right to suppress information obtained in violation of the
29
Fourth Amendment. The case, INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, involved two
Mexican citizens who were issued orders of deportation by immigra30
tion judges in two separate hearings. The individuals were arrested
27
28
29
30

131 S. Ct. 2419, 2428 (2011).
Id. at 2440 (emphasis omitted) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1034 (1984).
Id. at 1034–36. Both cases arose out of the Ninth Circuit. Id. The first case, LopezMendoza, originated in a California immigration court; the second, Sandoval-Sanchez, originated in a Washington immigration court. Id. Both individuals challenged the introduction of evidence under the Fourth Amendment. Id. The immigration courts in both cases denied the challenges and ultimately ordered both individuals deported. Id. The
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under different circumstances, but both subsequently admitted illegal
31
entry into the United States. Both men objected to the legality of
32
Immigration judges in both
their arrests in immigration court.
hearings found that the legality of the arrests irrelevant and therefore
33
ordered both men deported. Both men appealed the deportation
order to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which sustained the or34
ders and reasoning of the lower court. Both men again appealed,
35
this time to the Ninth Circuit. The Ninth Circuit reversed by hold-

factual situations surrounding their arrests varied, though both were arrested during
workplace raids. Id. at 1035–36. In Lopez-Mendoza’s case, the INS, operating on a tip,
did not have an arrest warrant and were denied entry to the building by the owner of the
business during work hours. Id. at 1035. Despite this refusal, the INS proceeded onto the
property and began to question Lopez-Mendoza. Id. He admitted his name, Mexican citizenship, and lack of family ties in the United States. Id. Based on this information, the
INS arrested Lopez-Mendoza and took him to INS offices for further questioning. Id.
During this subsequent questioning, Lopez-Mendoza admitted that he had entered the
United States without authorization. Id. The INS officers prepared an I–213 Record of
Deportable Alien form, and dictated an affidavit that Lopez-Mendoza subsequently
signed. Id. During immigration court, he objected to the legality of the arrest, but the
immigration judge ruled that such issue was irrelevant in immigration court. Id.
The INS similarly arrested Sandoval-Sanchez at work during an immigration raid. Id. at
1036. In this case, the INS did receive permission from the manager on duty. Id. Agents stationed themselves at the entrance to the plant to observe “passing employees who averted their
heads, avoided eye contact, or tried to hide themselves in a group.” Id. at 1036–37. They then
questioned the individuals and if they were unable to respond to general questions in English
or “otherwise aroused [the agent’s] suspicions” they were questioned about their immigration
status. Id. at 1037. The agents did not recall Sandoval-Sanchez’s questioning specifically but
stated that they were “certain that no one was questioned about his status unless his actions had
given the agents reason to believe that he was an undocumented alien.” Id. Sandoval-Sanchez
maintains he was never told of his right to remain silent. Id. In immigration court, SandovalSanchez objected to the legality of his arrest, but the immigration judge first ruled that the arrest was not illegal, and alternatively that such issue was not relevant. Id.
31
Id. at 1035, 1037.
32
Id. Sandoval-Sanchez also objected to his admission of illegal entry, but Lopez-Mendoza
did not. Id. at 1040.
33
Id. at 1034.
34
Id.
35
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1034. Immigration proceedings are administrative court proceedings housed within the Executive Office of Immigration Review. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.0(a)
(2004). The trial stage is set before immigration judges in courts that are located
throughout the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.9(d) (2007). Appeals are then taken to
the next level, the Board of Immigration Appeals, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b) (1997), and are
typically based on briefs, rather than oral argument. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(7)–(8)
(1997) (providing that oral argument before a panel of Board members is not given as of
right, but as a matter of discretion). The Board of Immigration Appeals is located in Arlington, Virginia, and all immigration court appeals throughout the country are centralized there. Id. However, for the next level of review, the circuit courts, jurisdiction lies
with the circuit in which the immigration proceedings originated. Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82–414 INA § 242, 66 Stat. 163, 208–210 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2)).
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ing that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied in immi36
gration court. The Supreme Court reviewed the case using the Janis
balancing test and ultimately held that the exclusionary rule does not
37
apply to civil immigration proceedings.
This Part will discuss the application of the Janis test in LopezMendoza. Section A gives a brief overview of how immigration proceedings were structured at the time of the Lopez-Mendoza decision.
Section B reviews the Supreme Court’s decision to use the Janis test,
and then discusses the application of the test.
A. Background on Immigration Proceedings
In order to fully understand the effect of suppression in immigration proceedings, some background related to the structure of immigration proceedings at the time of the Lopez-Mendoza decision is required. Immigration proceedings are civil cases, adjudicated by im38
immigration judges within an administrative agency. Immigration
proceedings are divided into two separate phases: first, the determination of whether an individual is deportable from the United States,
and then whether they are eligible for a form of relief from deporta-

36

37

38

Id. The immigration judge in Sandoval-Sanchez’s case made a finding on the legality of
the arrest, so the Ninth Circuit was able to make a substantive ruling in his case, finding
that the immigration judge erred, and that the arrest and subsequent admission should
be suppressed. See id. at 1037–38 (discussing the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning for its decision
with respect to Sandoval-Sanchez’s case). Since the immigration judge had avoided the
substantive issue of the legality of arrest in Lopez-Mendoza’s case, the Ninth Circuit reversed the order of deportation and remanded back to the court to undergo the analysis.
Id. at 1035–36.
See id. at 1042 (“Applying the Janis balancing test to the benefits and costs of excluding
concededly reliable evidence from a deportation proceeding, we therefore reach the
same conclusion as in Janis [that the exclusionary rule should not apply to these proceedings].”). Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion for Parts I–IV in which Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined; and Part V for which only
Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined. See id. at 1034 (noting the justices who joined
with respect to each part of the opinion). Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens
all filed dissenting opinions. Id. at 1051–61 (containing the various dissenting opinions).
8 C.F.R. § 1003.14 (2012). The Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) was
created in 1983, just before the Supreme Court decision in Lopez-Mendoza. See 48 Fed.
Reg. 8038, 8038–40 (Feb. 25, 1983) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pts. 1, 3, 100) (announcing
the creation of the EOIR). It is important to note that the cases on review in LopezMendoza were adjudicated under the former structure of the INS that included special inquiry officers within the INS, rather than Administrative Law Judges within EOIR. However, these changes were made well before the case was briefed and argued before the
Supreme Court. The case was argued on Wednesday, April 19, 1984. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. at 1032.
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tion. 39 Further, there were two types of proceedings: the first, exclusion proceedings, applied to individuals who were seeking admission
to the United States; the second, deportation proceedings, to those
who had either entered the United States without inspection, or to
those who had entered lawfully but were charged with violating the
40
terms of their stay in the United States.
In an exclusion proceeding, the burden is on the alien to demon41
strate that they are eligible to enter the country. In a deportation
proceeding, the initial burden is placed on the government to show
by “clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence that the facts alleged
42
as grounds for deportation are true.” In order to meet this burden,
a finding of deportation must be based on “reasonable, substantial,
43
and probative evidence.” Note that the different burdens of proof
in these two proceedings have a profound effect on certain constitu44
tional rights. For instance, although an individual may rely on the
Fifth Amendment to remain silent about potential information lead39

40

41

42

43
44

See INA § 240(a)(1) (codified as 8 U.S.C. 1229a(a) (2006)) (determining deportabilitiy);
see also INA § 240(c)(4) (codified as 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4) (2006)) (governing applications for relief from deportation).
Although those not practicing in immigration court colloquially refer to all immigration
proceedings as “deportation,” it is important to distinguish the legal terms for proceedings.
As discussed here, the actual proceedings pre-1996 were termed “exclusion/deportation,” while after 1996 and the statutory revamp of IIRIRA, the proceedings
were unified into what are called “removal proceedings.” For a more in-depth explanation of these proceedings, see THOMAS ALEINIKOFF, DAVID MARTIN, HIROSHI MOTOMURA,
AND MARYELLEN FULLERTON, IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 1147–
48, 1158–1773 (7th ed. 2011).
See In re Singh, 21 I&N Dec. 427, 431 n.4 (BIA 1996) (“The burden in exclusion proceedings is ordinarily upon the applicant to establish that he is admissible to the United
States.”); see also INA, Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 291, 66 Stat. 163, 234–35 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1361 (1994)). Although courts often cite to the United States
Code when referring to the Immigration and Nationality Act (found in Chapter 8), this
Article cites directly to the INA because it has not been incorporated into the Code as
positive law. See Positive Law Codification, OFFICE OF THE LAW REVISION COUNSEL,
http://uscode.house.gov/codification/legislation.shtml (last visited Feb. 21, 2015, 5:10
PM) (indicating non-positive law titles in the Code, including Title 8).
Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 286 (1966); see also 8 C.F.R. § 240.8(a) (1997) (“A respondent charged with deportability shall be found to be removable if the Service proves by
clear and convincing evidence that the respondent is deportable as charged.”). This
would require the government to demonstrate respondent’s alienage, and to provide
some evidence that he or she was not lawfully present. See INA § 240(c)(3) (2004) (articulating the kind of evidence the government must present to meet its burden).
INA, Pub. L. No. 82–414, § 242(b)(4), 66 Stat. 163, 210 (1952) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1252(b)(7)(B)).
See In re Castellon, 17 I&N Dec. 616, 620 (BIA 1981) (citing In re Cenatice, et al., 16 I&N
Dec. 162 (BIA 1977)) (“[A]pplicants for admission in exclusion proceedings do not ordinarily enjoy the same constitutional rights that are available to aliens who have made an
entry into the United States.”)
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ing to a criminal prosecution, 45 an immigration judge may draw an
46
adverse inference from this silence. Thus, mere silence in an exclusion proceeding could lead to a finding against the alien because the
burden is on the alien to present evidence of lawful presence in the
47
country. However, in a deportation proceeding, because the burden is on the government to prove unlawful presence in the country,
a statement of silence could still lead to the government failing to
48
meet the burden for deportation if no other evidence is introduced.
In both deportation and exclusion proceedings, once the first
phase of the hearing is complete and the individual is found to be either excludable or deportable, the individual is then allowed to re49
quest relief from deportation from the United States. Although the
Court was not faced with the issue of forms of relief in Lopez-Mendoza,
it is important to note that an individual in deportation proceedings
was eligible for a number of additional forms of relief than an indi50
vidual in exclusion proceedings. Decisions from the immigration
45

46

47

48

49

50

See In re R-, 4 I&N Dec. 720, 721 (BIA 1952) (“The fifth amendment to the Constitution of
the United States protects a witness testifying in deportation proceedings from giving evidence which would tend to show his guilt under a Federal criminal statute.”) (citations
omitted).
See In re Guevara, 20 I&N Dec. 238, 241 (BIA 1991) (“[U]nder certain circumstances, an
adverse inference may indeed be drawn from a respondent’s silence in deportation proceedings.”).
See id. at 241–42 (citing United States v. Sing Tuck, 194 U.S. 161 (1904)) (discussing exclusion proceedings and noting that “when confronted with evidence of, for example, the
respondent’s alienage, the circumstances of his entry, or his deportability, a respondent
who remains silent may leave himself open to adverse inferences, which may properly
lead in turn to a finding of deportability against him”).
Id. at 242 (finding that the holdings of cases in the context of exclusion proceedings “by
no means mitigate the clear requirement . . . that the burden of proof in deportation
proceedings is upon the Service to establish the alienage of the respondent, and ultimately his deportability, by evidence that is clear, unequivocal, and convincing”).
There are various forms of relief found throughout the INA, ranging from voluntary departure, which simply allows the individual to voluntarily leave the country without an order of deportation and the accompanying penalties, to asylum, which eventually allows
the individual to become a lawful permanent resident. See INA, Pub. L. No. 82–414, §
242(b)(1), 66 Stat. 163, 210 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1994)) (providing for voluntary departure for alien under deportation proceedings); INA § 208 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (1994)) (allowing aliens physically present in the
United States to apply for asylum); INA §§ 242(b)(1), 208 (1994). The forms of relief
from deportation are located throughout the INA and come in the form of waivers (such
as section 212(c) or 212(h)) or substantive relief (such as asylum under section 208). See
Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States: A Case Study on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 433, 441 n.19 (1992) (discussing the major forms of relief available in deportation proceedings).
For instance, while asylum under § 208 was available in both exclusion and deportation
proceedings, voluntary departure and suspension of deportation was only available in de-
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court are directly appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals
51
(BIA).
In order to address the propriety of using the exclusionary rule in
Lopez-Mendoza, the Court first looked to how the two individuals attempted to invoke the rule during the first phase of immigration pro52
ceedings. In the first case, Lopez-Mendoza argued the illegality of
the arrest led to his placement in immigration court, and objected
53
only to the fact of initiation of proceedings against him. The Court
quickly dispensed of his case by holding that even if the exclusionary
rule applied in immigration court, the outcome would not have
54
changed his case. The Court reasoned that because Lopez-Mendoza
objected only to the initiation of proceedings, and not to the evidence presented against him, use of the exclusionary rule would not
55
benefit him.
Sandoval-Sanchez, however, objected not only to the proceedings,
but also to the evidence presented against him—namely, the I-213
that formed the basis for his arrest and statements made during the
56
arrest. The Court recognized that Sandoval-Sanchez’s objection to
the evidence offered against him was properly within the purview of
the exclusionary rule, as both statements and evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment would be excluded if the conduct in question had a substantial connection to the unlawful con-

51
52
53
54
55

56

portation proceedings. INA, Pub. L. No. 82–414 § 242(b)(1), 66 Stat. 163, (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1252 (1994)); INA, Pub. L. No. 82–414 § 244, 66 Stat. 163, (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § (1994)); INA §§ 242(b)(1), 244 (1994).
8 C.F.R. 1240.15.
INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040 (1984).
Id.
Id.
Id. Prior cases, both in criminal as well as civil forfeiture proceedings, have held that the
identity, or “body,” of an individual is a fact that is not suppressible under the exclusionary rule. Id. at 1039–40.
See id. at 1037–38, 1040 (describing the initial proceedings in Sandoval-Sanchez’s case).
An I–213 is a Record of Deportable Alien, which is “essentially a recorded recollection of
a conversation with the alien” by the examining officer. Bustos-Torres v. INS, 898 F.2d
1053, 1056 (5th Cir. 1990).
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duct. 57 The question therefore became whether, and to what extent,
58
the exclusionary rule applied to immigration proceedings.
B. Application of the Exclusionary Rule in Civil Proceedings: The Janis Test
In order to assess whether the exclusionary rule should apply in
immigration proceedings, the Court began by determining the nature of the proceeding, finding it to be “a purely civil action to determine eligibility to remain in the country, not to punish an unlaw59
In comparing immigration court proceedings to the
ful entry.”
criminal system, the Court indicated that the only issue adjudicated
in the immigration context is whether the individual should be deported, rather than a determination of guilt for potential criminal vi60
Citing
olations related to immigration (such as unlawful entry).
multiple cases, the Court observed that constitutional protections in
criminal proceedings do not automatically extend to immigration
61
proceedings. In addition, the Court observed, the burden of proof
in immigration court is significantly different from the “beyond a rea62
sonable doubt” burden in the criminal context. The INS has the
burden to demonstrate identity and alienage based on “reasonable,
substantial, and probative evidence” for an alien who entered the

57

58

59

60

61

62

See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1040–41 (citing Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471
(1963)) (“The general rule in a criminal proceeding is that statements and other evidence obtained as a result of an unlawful, warrantless arrest are suppressible if the link
between the evidence and the unlawful conduct is not too attenuated.”); see also Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961) (holding that “all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . . inadmissible in a state court”); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (establishing the exclusionary rule).
See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041 (“The reach of the exclusionary rule beyond the context of a criminal prosecution . . . is less clear . . . . [T]he court has never squarely addressed the question before.”).
Id. at 1038. The Supreme Court has long held that deportation is not a punishment, but
instead “removal of an alien out of the country, simply because his presence is deemed
inconsistent with the public welfare.” Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 709
(1893). For a discussion of deportation as punishment, see Sarah Paige, Deportation, Due
Process, and Deference: Recent Developments in Immigration Law, 22 COLUM. J. OF POL. & SOC’Y
149, 179–82 (2011).
See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038 (“The judge’s sole power [in a deportation hearing] is
to order deportation; the judge cannot adjudicate guilt or punish the respondent for any
crime related to unlawful entry into or presence in this country.”).
Id. at 1038–39. See, e.g., Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (finding no application
of Ex Post Facto Clause to deportation); United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U.S.
149, 157 (1923) (finding rule excluding involuntary confessions not applicable in deportation hearings); Navia-Duran v. INS, 568 F.2d 803, 808 (1st Cir. 1977) (finding no requirement of Miranda warnings in deportation case).
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1039 (citation omitted).
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country unlawfully. 63 The burden then shifts to the alien to prove any
64
Based on these facts, the
eligibility for relief from deportation.
65
Court held that the system was purely civil. Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the Janis test should be utilized to determine whether
66
the exclusionary rule applies to immigration proceedings.
The Court acknowledged that the reach of the exclusionary rule
outside of the criminal context was “less clear” and had “never [been]
67
squarely addressed.” The Court turned to the framework set out in
United States v. Janis, noting that, although the test was imprecise, it
created the necessary tools for weighing social benefits against social
68
costs. In Janis, the Court indicated that any balancing must recognize that the “prime purpose” of the exclusionary rule “is to deter fu69
ture unlawful police conduct.” After weighing the benefits and costs
in that case, the Court held the exclusionary rule inapplicable because it was not necessary to deter the actors through exclusion of ev70
idence in a civil hearing. After all, reasoned the Court, the exclusionary rule already renders unlawfully seized evidence unavailable in
71
any state or federal criminal trial. Put differently, the Court thought
that there would be no benefit in deterrence, but a significant cost in
loss of evidence. In relying on the Janis balancing in Lopez-Mendoza,

63
64

65
66

67

68
69
70
71

Id.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(2)(A) (2012) (“In the proceeding the alien has the burden of
establishing—(A) if the alien is an applicant for admission, that the alien is clearly and
beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible . . . .”).
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1038.
See id. at 1042 (applying the Janis balancing test). However, it is important to note that
the Justices made a leap in logic by stating that simply because several criminal constitutional protections do not apply in a civil context, that the proceeding was meant to be only a streamlined process of eligibility to remain in this country and “nothing more.” See
id. at 1039 (“In short, a deportation hearing is intended to provide a streamlined determination of eligibility to remain in this country, nothing more.”). Although this Article
discusses only the evolution of immigration law and increasing complexity since LopezMendoza, courts have long stated that deportation proceedings are far from a noncomplex, “streamlined” process. See infra Part II.A.2.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041. The Court noted that the issue had been discussed in a
prior case, Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 155, wherein the Court “assumed” evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment would be excluded from a hearing within the Department of Labor. However, that case did not expressly analyze whether the rule should
be applied. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041.
Id.
United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414
U. S. 338, 347 (1974)).
Id. at 454.
Id. at 446–47.
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the Court solidified an actual test to determine to what extent the ex72
clusionary rule would apply in the civil context.
To apply the test in Lopez-Mendoza, the Court first assessed the deterrent value of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings,
highlighting six major factors: (1) the primary objective of the enforcement agents; (2) whether the enforcement agents are within the
same agency initiating proceedings; (3) what effect the suppression
will have on the proceedings; (4) current use of the suppression doctrine; (5) internal agency procedures for addressing Constitutional
73
violations; and (6) alternative remedies available.
The Court recognized that two factors favored use of the exclusionary rule in the immigration system. First, although immigration
proceedings are often viewed as the civil complement to a potential
74
criminal trial (e.g., unlawful entry), the Court noted that only “a
very small percentage” of the individuals in immigration proceedings
75
are actually prosecuted criminally. Thus, immigration enforcement
agents primarily seek to use evidence gained from arrests in the civil
76
immigration proceedings. Excluding evidence in an immigration
proceeding would result in a high level of deterrence, as it would be
77
the only venue in which the evidence is presented. Second, the
78
same agency that effectuates an arrest will also decide whether to in79
Key in this factor is the
itiate immigration proceedings.
intrasovereign nature of the violation: The agency that seeks to benefit from the evidence is the same agency that controls the agents
80
gathering the evidence. The Court held that against this backdrop,
suppressing evidence would serve as an effective deterrent because of
the direct and negative consequence to both the officers and the
81
agency collecting the evidence.
In addition to analyzing if exclusion would deter agents from
committing Fourth Amendment violations, the Court noted a sec72
73
74

75
76
77
78

79
80
81

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041.
Id. at 1042–45.
The INA provides for both civil and criminal penalties for various infractions. For instance, unlawful entry can result in a criminal charge under § 275, as well as a charge of
inadmissibility in immigration proceedings under § 212.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1042–43.
Id. at 1043.
Id. at 1042–43.
At the time of the Lopez-Mendoza decision, immigration enforcement, prosecution, and
adjudication were each carried out by the Immigration and Nationality Service. INA
§§ 235, 239 (1996).
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043.
See id. at 1043; see also Janis, 428 U.S. at 455.
See Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043.
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ondary test in civil court exclusion cases—that is, whether social costs
associated with exclusion are properly outweighed by individual pri82
vacy benefits. In the case of immigration proceedings, the Court determined that the costs to society were high, thus resulting in little
83
benefit. The main cost with applying the exclusionary rule, according to the Court, was the prospect of a large undocumented popula84
tion and the need to address this problem. Particularly problematic
for the Court was the nature of immigration laws governing undocu85
mented presence. Given that unlawful presence in the country is a
continuing violation, the Court compared release from immigration
court to forcing law enforcement agents to return unlawful explosives, drugs, or firearms to individuals if seized in violation of the
86
In a reference to Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s
Fourth Amendment.
oft-cited quotation from People v. Defore, the Court stated that “[t]he
constable’s blunder may allow the criminal to go free, but we have
never suggested that it allows the criminal to continue in the commis87
sion of an ongoing crime.”
The only societal benefit the Court addressed in its opinion was
the need to protect the constitutional rights of both documented
88
Although a “legitimate and important
immigrants and citizens.
concern,” said the Court, it quickly rejected the argument because
those present lawfully would not benefit from suppression; after all,
89
they cannot be placed in deportation proceedings. Thus, the only
additional Fourth Amendment protection available to these individuals would be to deter INS agents from arresting them, which the
Court had already discussed as being ineffectual due to the vast num90
ber of arrests made by each agent.
In assessing the factors that would decrease the deterrent effect of
the use of the exclusionary rule, the Court noted three factors: (1)
the streamlined nature of immigration proceedings, (2) the INS’s in82
83
84

85
86

87
88
89
90

See id. at 1046.
Id. at 1047–48.
In discussing the number of undocumented immigrants present, as well as the number
arrested each year, the Court discussed “the staggering dimension of the problem that
the INS confronts.” Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1046.
See id. at 1046. Unlawful presence is a violation of the civil portion of the INA and is considered “continuing” as long as the individual does not have status. INA § 212(a)(6)(A).
As civil violation of the INA, it is the basis for institution of immigration proceedings.
INA §§ 239–40.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1047 (quoting People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21 (1926)).
See id. at 1045.
Id. at 1045–46.
See infra notes 99–101.
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ternal control over Fourth Amendment violations, and (3) the lack of
individual deterrent effect on any given agent within the INS because
91
of the large numbers of arrests made by each agent. Regarding the
streamlined nature of immigration proceedings, the Court stressed
the need to maintain a simplified hearing process for determining
92
whether an individual should be removed from the United States.
To support this idea, the Court cited to In re Sandoval, in which the
BIA stated that immigration hearings typically involve “simple factual
93
As such, immigration judges
allegations and matters of proof.”
would not likely be familiar with “the intricacies of Fourth Amend94
ment law.” The Court further stated that the fast-paced and simplified nature of the apprehension, hearing, and deportation of individuals should excuse enforcement agents from the need to “compile
elaborate, contemporaneous, written reports detailing the circum95
stances of every arrest.”
Another important factor in the Court’s analysis was that INS had
developed its own internal “comprehensive scheme for deterring
96
Fourth Amendment violations . . . .” Included in this comprehensive scheme were: internal regulations, initial training, continuing
education, and an internal process for investigation and punishment
97
for violations. Because INS agents were the only individuals charged
with enforcing civil immigration law, and each one was subject to this
comprehensive scheme of training and investigation, adding the exclusionary rule would not likely result in increased deterrence of un98
constitutional behavior.
The Court also noted that the number of arrests that result in
hearings (versus individuals that voluntarily depart) did not support
the notion that any individual agent would be affected in a significant
99
enough manner to cause a change in behavior. Based on numbers
provided by the agency in appellate briefs, each agent arrests about
100
Of those arrested in any given year, about
500 people per year.

91
92
93
94
95
96

97
98
99
100

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1043–48.
Id. at 1048–49.
Id. (quoting In re Sandoval, 17 I&N 70, 80 (1979).
Id. at 1048.
Id. at 1049.
Id. at 1044. The Court admitted that an internal scheme does not guarantee compliance
with the Fourth Amendment but noted that “[d]eterrence must be measured at the margin.” Id. at 1045.
Id. at 1045.
Id.
Id. at 1044.
Id. (citation omitted).
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97.5% agree to leave without a hearing in a procedure known as
101
“voluntary departure.” Of the remaining 2.5%, few challenge their
arrests and instead seek a form of relief from deportation in immigra102
tion court.
The data therefore reveals that even if 25% of those who pursue
proceedings filed motions to suppress, then objections would occur
103
in only three out of 500 arrests. In the past thirty years, fewer than
fifty cases raised a Fourth Amendment challenge to the introduction
of evidence at the BIA level, and only two of those applied to the ex104
clusionary rule.
Finally, the Court noted that even if a respondent were allowed to
suppress evidence gathered during an arrest, a removal hearing
would likely still proceed because of evidentiary rules, burdens of
proof, and the inability to utilize other criminally related constitu105
As Lopez-Mendoza’s case demonstrated, the
tional doctrines.
“body” is not suppressible under criminal, let alone civil, court cas106
The Court reasoned that the presence of the respondent in
es.
court, coupled with both the low statutory burden on the government
and the ability to draw an adverse inference from silence, would result in sufficient evidence to move forward in an immigration pro107
ceeding even if certain evidence was suppressed.
In what was to become the most litigated aspect of the case, the
widespread violations and egregiousness exception, Justice Sandra
Day O’Connor included a single paragraph in Part V of the opinion,
108
which only four of the five majority opinion Justices joined. In this
single paragraph, Justice O’Connor left open a crack in immigrationrelated litigation by stating that the holding of the Court dealt only
with “peaceful arrests” and not “egregious violations of Fourth

101

102
103
104
105
106
107

108

Id. An individual can choose to leave the United States voluntarily without invoking their
right to immigration proceedings. INA § 240B(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1229c(a) (2006);
C.F.R. § 240.25.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044.
See id.
Id.
Id. at 1043–44.
Id. at 1039.
Id. at 1043–44. See supra notes 41–45 and accompanying text, for a discussion on the burden of proof and the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent in immigration proceedings.
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1050–51 (acknowledging that the majority’s “conclusion concerning the exclusionary rule’s value might change, if there developed good reason to believe that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were widespread,” and noting
that this case did not “deal [] with egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other
liberties”).
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Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative value of the evidence
109
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor noted that the Court’s
obtained.”
decision could be swayed “if there developed good reason to believe
that Fourth Amendment violations by INS officers were wide110
spread.”
II. REASSESSING SOCIAL COST AND DETERRENCE BENEFITS
Both immigration and criminal suppression law have undergone
substantial changes since the Lopez-Mendoza case. In the nearly thirty
years since the decision, the changes to both aspects of the law are
111
This Part discusses how
too numerous to discuss in one article.
changes related to the process in immigration proceedings and the
structure of enforcement have fundamentally altered three of the
main factors the Court pointed to as decreasing the deterrence value
of the exclusionary rule in Lopez-Mendoza. Section A discusses how intervening legislation has changed the nature of the judicial system
through unification of the deportation proceeding and increased
complexity in the law during both phases of the proceeding (determination of deportation and requests for relief). Section B focuses
on how the use of state and local law enforcement has watered down
the comprehensive scheme the Court pointed to in assessing the
INS’s ability to self-regulate violations. And finally Section C addresses how the introduction of these changes has drastically decreased
the number of arrests each agent has, resulting in an increase of individual deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule.
A. Nature of Immigration Proceedings
Out of the many changes to the immigration system since LopezMendoza, there are three pieces of legislation that have had the larg109
110
111

Id.
Id. at 1050.
For example, there are over 100 pieces of legislation since 2000 that have amended the
INA to some degree or another. Some of these pieces were directed at specific groups of
people, such as lawful permanent residence for members of the Armed Forces. Act of
Nov. 23, 2011, Pub. L. NO. 112–58, 125 Stat. 747. Others saw more sweeping changes
throughout the statute, with changes to various immigration definitions and benefits. See,
e.g., Child Status Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L. NO. 107–208, 116 Stat. 927 (redefining
whether an alien is a child for the purposes of classification as an “immediate relative”).
This legislation contained mainly employer sanctions and discrimination issues, but also
saw the first major “legalization” of unlawful presence. Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99–603, 100 Stat. 3359.
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est impact: the Immigration Act of 1990, 112 and the 1996 dual legislation found in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
113
This Section first reviews how IIRIRA
Penalty Act (“AEDPA”).
made significant changes to the process in deportation proceedings,
then focuses on how all three of these pieces of legislation increased
the complexity of the nature of immigration law.
1. From Exclusion and Deportation to Removal
IIRIRA made a fundamental change to the deportation process as
described in Part I of this Article. Rather than two separate types of
proceedings—exclusion and deportation—IIRIRA folded them to114
gether into one “removal proceeding.” By creating unified removal
proceedings, Congress essentially eliminated any procedural distinction between those who entered with documentation and those who
115
did not in order to streamline the deportation process. The unified
removal proceeding follows many of the same procedures as the old
form of deportation hearings (as opposed to exclusion proceed116
Once an individual comes to the attention of Immigration
ings).
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), they are issued a Notice to Ap112
113

114

115

116

Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. NO. 101–649, 104 Stat 4978.
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. NO. 104–
208, 110 Stat. 3009–546. IIRIRA was passed simultaneously with the Antiterrorism and Effect Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. NO. 104–132, 110 Stat. 1214. Jointly, these two
statutes changed everything from criminal sanctions, to grounds for deportation, and the
judicial system. Although these changes are the most significant for purposes of this article, it should be noted that extensive changes were made after 1984 and before IIRIRA.
See Kati L. Griffith, Perfecting Public Immigration Legislation: Private Immigration Bills and Deportable Lawful Permanent Residents, 18 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 273, 289–90 (2004) (discussing
the state of immigration law prior to 1996).
IIRIRA §§ 304, 308 (codified at INA §§ 239, 240C, and INA §§ 238–240, 240C). In addition to the unified removal proceedings, IIRIRA created “expedited removal” which applies to anyone attempting to enter the country without documentation or using false
documents, and to unlawful entrants within the border zone. IIRIRA § 302 (codified at
INA § 235). Although this Article focuses on the internal procedure of removal proceedings, it should be noted that expedited removal is the subject of scrutiny by scholars for
lack of constitutional protections. See Jennifer Lee Koh, Waiving Due Process (Goodbye):
Stipulated Orders of Removal and the Crisis in Immigration Adjudication, 91 N.C. L. REV. 475,
520–29 (2013) (arguing that stipulated removal orders run afoul of due process).
See Patricia Flynn & Judith Patterson, Five Years Later: Fifth Circuit Case Law Developments
Under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 557,
561 (2001) (“[T]o streamline the removal process, IIRIRA provided for limited judicial
review [and] expedited removal proceedings (removal without a hearing before an immigration judge) . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
IIRIRA §§ 304, 308 (codified at INA § 239–40) (describing the procedures for removal
proceedings).
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pear (“NTA”). 117 The NTA will provide factual allegations, including
118
alienage, as well as charges of removability. The charges will fall in119
If
to one of two categories: either deportability or inadmissibility.
an individual is charged with deportability, they have been admitted
to the United States in some status (entered with a temporary or
120
permanent visa) and their status is called into question. If an individual is charged with inadmissibility, they did not enter the United
121
States in any status and are undocumented.
In removal proceedings, the government has the initial burden to
122
For those aliens charged with removademonstrate deportability.
bility, the government must demonstrate alienage and that the alien
is deportable under immigration laws by “clear and convincing evi123
For those aliens charged with inadmissibility, the governdence.”
ment must only demonstrate alienage, and then the alien must show
124
If the
clearly and beyond a doubt that they are not inadmissible.
individual is shown to be either inadmissible or deportable, they can
125
then apply for any number of forms of relief from removal. It is, of
course, the individual’s burden to demonstrate not only eligibility for

117
118
119

120

121

122
123
124
125

IIRIRA § 304 (codified at INA § 239(a)(1)).
Id.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (2012) (describing classes of inadmissible aliens); see also 8 U.S.C §
1227 (2012) (describing classes of deportable aliens). Although the procedure is unified
into removal proceedings, the distinction between inadmissibility and deportability mirror the old system’s distinction between exclusion proceedings and deportation proceedings. See Dana Leigh Marks and Denise Noonan Slavin, A View Through the Looking Glass:
How Crimes Appear from the immigration court Perspective, 39 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 91, 96 n.21
(2011) (noting that, despite the unification of exclusion proceedings and deportation
proceedings into removal proceedings, “in many ways the procedures remain substantially unchanged as there are still significant legal distinctions between those individuals who
are seeking admission as opposed to those who have already entered the country, either
legally or illegally”).
Any violation of the terms of an individual’s stay can lead to this, including overstaying a
temporary visa, or the commission of specific types of crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a) (2012).
Nonimmigrants are typically given a specific period of time to remain in the United
States. 8 U.S.C. § 1227 (b), (d) (2012). Any violation of the grounds of deportability will
lead to the institution of removal proceedings. INA § 237(a)(2008) (codified as 8 U.S.C.
§ 1227(a) (2012)).
The section of the INA that applies to these individuals is the section that applies to any
individual seeking entrance, or admission, into the country. INA § 212(a) (codified as 8
U.S.C. § 1182 (2013). The INA sets up a legal fiction that, although the individual is in
the United States, they are not “legally” present. Id.
IIRIRA § 304 (codified at INA § 240(c)(3)).
Id.
This burden applies to both arriving aliens and aliens present without admission or parole. Id. § 304 (codified at INA § 240(c)(2)(A)–(B)).
REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109–13, § 101(d), 119 Stat. 302, 304 (codified as
amended at INA § 240(c)(4)).
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the form of relief, but also that they merit a favorable exercise of dis126
cretion on the part of the immigration judge.
As with the prior deportation hearings, the current immigration
127
court is set up as an adversarial bench hearing. There is an impartial immigration judge, charged with upholding the immigration
128
statutes. The two parties are the alien, or respondent, and the gov129
During the
ernment, represented by the Litigation Unit of ICE.
master calendar, the preliminary hearing, the respondent pleads to
130
The Respondent can either admit
the charges listed in the NTA.
the allegations or concede the charges and state the form of relief
they seek, or she can deny the allegations and charges, and request a
131
contested removability hearing. Then an individual calendar hear132
ing is set to hear the merits of the case (either the form of the re133
Since the Federal Rules of Civil Prolief, or accuracy of charges).
cedure and the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in
immigration court, the governing body of the agency has issued an
immigration court Practice Manual, which serves to function in place
134
of these rules. Individuals in court must abide by these rules, which
pertain to court appearances, filing deadlines, forms of motion, and
135
procedures for filing.
2. Complexity
Judges have often recognized the complexity of immigration law,
pointing to both the intricacy of procedure, as well as challenges as126
127
128

129
130

131
132
133
134

135

Id. (codified as amended at INA §§ 240(c)(4)(B), 240(c)(4)(A)(ii).
Proceedings to Determine Removability of Aliens in the United States, 8 C.F.R. 1240.1(c)
(2015).
Immigration judges are charged with many general judicial duties such as administering
oaths, receiving evidence, and issuing subpoenas, but are also granted the right and duty
to interrogate, examine, and cross-examine witnesses. See IIRIRA § 304 (codified at INA §
240(b)) (articulating immigration judges’ roles and responsibilites).
See 8 C.F.R. 1240.2 (2007) (“Service counsel shall present on behalf of the government . . . .”).
8 C.F.R. 1240.10(a). The NTA is divided into three main sections: The first contains factual allegations that allege country of birth and citizenship, date of entry, manner of entry, and any facts related to the violation of status or undocumented entry; the second
section charges either removability or inadmissibility, as discussed above; the third section
contains information on service of the NTA. IIRIRA § 304 (codified at § 239(a)(1)).
8 C.F.R. 1240.10(c).
Id.
Id. at § 1240.11.
See immigration court Practice Manual, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/vll/OCIJPracManual/ocij_page1.htm (last updated Oct. 2013) (providing guidelines for immigration court proceedings).
Id.
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sociated with statutory interpretation and knowledge of the regulato136
ry system. The complexity of the laws has, on occasion, led to mis137
Although
understandings and even mistakes in court decisions.
there are a significant number of factors that have altered the immigration process since Lopez-Mendoza, changes in the substance of the
law for the two-step process in immigration court (both the initial
finding of inadmissibility/deportability and the potential forms of relief) have made a major impact on the increasing complexity of the
138
There are numerous ways in which the law
adjudication process.
has changed, but this Article will focus on three: the increasing of
the number and nature of the grounds of inadmissibility and removability, changes in both the forms of relief available and the legal
analysis used to make eligibility determinations, and structural
changes to the immigration court that increased federal litigation.
The Immigration Act of 1990 was the first massive overhaul of the
139
Among other
immigration system after the Lopez-Mendoza case.
changes, the Act expanded the definition of criminal grounds of deportability, including controlled substance violations and crimes of
violence, while also foreclosing any form of discretionary relief from

136

137

138

139

Circuit courts often express dismay at the labyrinthine laws that make up the immigration
system. See, e.g., Michele Kim, The Complexity of Immigration Law, IMMIGRATION DAILY,
http://www.ilw.com/articles/2006,1215-kim.shtm (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (providing a
collection of quotations from the Second, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh circuits relating to
this complexity). For example, in a decision pre-dating Lopez-Mendoza, the Second Circuit
noted that “[t]he Tax Laws and the Immigration and Nationality Acts are examples we
have cited of Congress’s ingenuity in passing statutes certain to accelerate the aging process of judges.” Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
David A. Isaacson, If Even the Chief Justice Can Misunderstand Immigration Law, THE
INSIGHTFUL IMMIGRATION DAILY BLOG, CYRUS D. MEHTA & ASSOCIATES, PLLC (June 3,
2011),
http://blog.cyrusmehta.com/2011/06/if-even-chief-justice-canmisunderstand.html (describing the failure of the majority in Chamber of Commerce v. Whiting, 131 S. Ct. 1968 (2011) to understand that the INA allows for work authorization to
individuals that have been ordered removed by an immigration judge).
Many commentators and scholars have pushed for a massive reorganization of the immigration system, pushing some aspect of the adjudicative process to traditional Article I, or
Article III courts. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59
DUKE L. J. 1635, 1640 (2010); National Association of immigration judges, Improving Efficiency and Ensuring Justice in the immigration court System, Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
May 18, 2011; LENNI B. BENSON & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ENHANCING QUALITY AND
TIMELINESS IN IMMIGRATION REMOVAL ADJUDICATION, REPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATIVE
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 117 (June 7, 2012).
Immigration Act of 1990, Pub.L. 101–649, 104 Stat. 4978. Although the 1986 IRCA made
significant changes to the employment aspect of immigration and contained a major legalization aspect, the Immigration Act of 1990 made more pervasive changes including
creating and changing the basis for many temporary and permanent visas, along with creating additional grounds for relief from deportation. Id. at. §§ 101–02, 111, 121, 301–03.

May 2015]

SUPPRESSION IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS

1417

deportation. 140 IIRIRA, coupled with the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act, again made a major change in the grounds of deportability, most notably by expanding the definition of “aggravated
felony,” a ground that not only results in deportation, but also results
141
in ineligibility for most forms of relief in immigration.
As the grounds for deportability have increased, so too has the
complexity of the legal analyses surrounding the application of these
grounds and eligibility for forms of relief. The increasing grounds of
criminal basis for removability have inexorably tied the immigration
142
system to criminal case law. Although that relationship would seem
to decrease complexity by allowing the immigration system to directly
import legal analysis from the criminal system, it has on occasion resulted in an increase in complexity when immigration adjudicators
143
elect to alter the criminal analysis.
Despite this increasing complexity in immigration proceedings,
the BIA was reduced in number and type of review. The BIA, the appellate body located within the immigration system, had grown to
twenty-three judges who were responsible for reviewing all appeals
144
In 2002, the Attorney
from immigration proceedings appeals.

140

141

142

143

144

INA §§ 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(II) and 212(a)(2)(C)(i) both contain provisions for inadmissibility based on the definition of controlled substances in 21 U.S.C. § 802. One of the aggravated felonies triggering deportability is a crime of violence defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16.
INA § 101(a)(43)(F).
See Nancy Morawetz, Rethinking Retroactive Deportation Laws and the Due Process Clause, 73
N.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 111–14 (1998); cf. INA §§ 237(a)(2) and 101(a)(43) (defining aggravated felony).
The most obvious way this is found is within the INA itself. Many of the aggravated felonies are defined through the federal criminal code. INA §§ 101(a)(43)(A),(U). For instance, one of the enumerated aggravated felonies is a crime of violence “as defined in
section 16 of title 18.” 101(a)(43)(F). Well over half of the enumerated aggravated felonies contain such a reference. INA §§ 101(a)(43)(B)–(F), (H)–(M), (P).
A timely example of this is the battle surrounding the categorical analysis. Although traditionally applied in the immigration context as laid out in Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S.
575 (1990), the Attorney General issued In re Silva-Trevino, 24 I&N Dec. 687, 700, 704
(A.G. 2008), adding the ability for judges to consider “additional evidence” in certain circumstances. Jennifer Koh offers a more in-depth discussion of this case, and the impact
of the recent Supreme Court decisions on the analysis, along with a discussion of complexity of deportability and forms of relief. Koh, supra note 16, at 1830–36. For an example of how forms of relief have been complicated, the REAL ID Act offers a prime example in the increased burden of proof, and credibility determination scheme laid out in
INA § 208(b)(3) of the asylum statutes. For further discussion of the complexity of the
asylum standard, see Anna O. Law, The Ninth Circuit’s Internal Adjudicative Procedures and
Their Effect on Pro Se and Asylum Appeals, 25 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 647, 653–57 (2011).
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2008); Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve
Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,878 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. §
1003 (2008)).

1418

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 17:5

General introduced an initiative referred to as “streamlining.” 145 This
initiative resulted in a massive restructuring of the BIA, moving from
146
Further, while the practice in the
twenty-three judges to eleven.
past had been to have a three-judge panel review most cases, this initiative provided for the majority of cases to be reviewed by a single
147
member. Practitioners, scholars, and immigration judges criticized
this new structure as creating a mere rubber stamp at this appellate
level, resulting in record numbers of appeals in nearly every circuit
148
around the country. Wait times in immigration courts have steadily
been rising, despite a decrease in charging documents being issued
149
by ICE.
B. Internal Control
Another major shift in the immigration process since Lopez150
Mendoza is how civil immigration law is enforced. When the LopezMendoza decision came out, law enforcement and immigration agencies believed that although local law enforcement had the power to
arrest based on federal criminal immigration law, federal officers ex-

145
146

147
148

149

150

Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67
Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,881 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003 (2008)).
Id.; see also Dory Mitros Durham, The Once and Future Judge: The Rise and Fall (and
Rise?) of Independence in U.S. Immigration Courts, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 655, 682–83
(2006).
8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a) (2008).
For a comprehensive discussion of this phenomenon, including statistics related to increases in appeals, increasing summary affirmances at the Board level, and decreasing
grants of forms of relief, see ANNA O. LAW, THE IMMIGRATION BATTLE IN AMERICAN
COURTS 144–155 (2010); see also Dana Leigh Marks, An Urgent Priority: Why Congress Should
Establish an Article I immigration court, 13 BENDER’S IMMIGRATION BULLETIN 3, 9 (2008);
Margot K. Mendelson, Constructing America: Mythmaking in U.S. Immigration Courts, 119
YALE L.J. 1012, 1038 (2010); John R.B. Palmer et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging
Board of Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis of the Recent
Surge in Petitions for Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2005); Veena Reddy, Judicial Review of Final Orders of Removal in the Wake of the Real ID Act, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 557, 596
(2008).
The average wait time in showing a steading increase in at least the past five years from
447 days in 2010 to 597 days in 2015. Immigration Court Backlog Tool, TRANSACTIONAL
RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/
(last visited March 20, 2015). In addition, new case openings have steadily decreased
since 2010 from 247,000 per year to a projected 221,500 per year in 2015. New Filings
Seeking Removal Orders in immigration courts through February 2015, TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS
ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/charges/apprep_
newfilings.php (last visited Mar. 20, 2015).
As argued, infra, the creation of programs allowing state and local law enforcement is responsible for this change. INA § 287(g) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357).
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clusively enforced civil immigration law. 151 Of course, the law did not
prohibit INS officers from requesting aid from local law enforcement
in an action, such as a raid, where the officers were “acting under the
152
direction of INS officers.” However, despite these powers of arrest
or work under the direct supervision of INS officers, local law enforcement were not explicitly provided with enforcement capability
for civil immigration law and, more importantly, were still required to
153
comply with the Fourth Amendment.
Shortly after the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control
Act of 1986, the former INS began to formally create ties to local law
enforcement agencies through the creation of the Institutional Removal Program (“IRP”) and the Alien Criminal Apprehension Pro154
These programs were merged into a single program (“ACAP”).
gram—the Criminal Alien Program (“CAP”)—in 2007, and continue
to operate within the federal, state, and local prison system to identify
155
In addition to this program,
convicted foreign-born individuals.
151

152
153

154

155

The distinction between enforcement of the criminal and the civil provisions was broadly
discussed in an Office of Legal Counsel memo which found that local law enforcement is
preempted by a “pervasive regulatory scheme” as analyzed in Gonzales v. City of Peoria, 722
F.2d 468, 474 (9th Cir. 1983). Memorandum from Douglas W. Kmiec, Assistant Attorney
General, Office of Legal Counsel to Joseph R. Davis, Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Re: Handling of INS Warrants of Deportation in Relation to NCIC Wanted
Person File at 5 (Apr. 11, 1989); see United States v. Cruz, 559 F.2d 300, 301 (5th Cir.
1977) (although initially stopped for a traffic violation, arrest and conviction were made
on federal criminal law); United States v. Contreras-Diaz, 575 F.2d 740, 745 (9th Cir.
1978) (permitting detention by local law enforcement based on reasonable suspicion of
violation of federal criminal law).
Zepeda v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 732 (9th Cir. 1983).
See United States v. Perez-Castro, 606 F.2d 251, 253 (9th Cir. 1979) (“The Government
may not successfully assert that the illegal act was done by state or local officers and therefore the statements subsequently taken are admissible in a federal prosecution, without
concern as to the method by which they were obtained.”).
US Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Secure Communities Fact Sheet 3, Mar. 28, 2008
(on file with author) [hereinafter S-Comm Fact Sheet]. IRP was a program that screened
convicted aliens serving sentences and attempted to initiate removal proceedings prior to
the end of their sentences. Id. Federal correctional facilities were required to report foreign born convicts, but the program relied on voluntary reporting from state and local
facilities. Immigration and Naturalization Service Institutional Removal Program Audit
Report [hereinafter IRP Audit Report], Sept. 2002 (on file with author). ACAP was a similar program that was meant to cover institutions not covered by IRP. S-Comm Fact Sheet
at 3. These programs were highly criticized as being inconsistent in enforcement and, as
such, lacked wide-level effectiveness. See Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of
the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate, Criminal Aliens in the
United States Report, 104–48, Apr. 7, 1995; IRP Audit Report. These programs were
merged into a single program—the Criminal Alien Program in 2007. S-Comm Fact Sheet
at 3.
Criminal Alien Program, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/criminal-alien-program/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
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Immigration and Customs Enforcement 156 created Secure Communi157
Under this program, upon arrest and fingerprinting,
ties in 2008.
local, state, and federal jurisdictions are required to submit the fingerprints to a Department of Homeland Security database, where the
agency can then determine if the individual is also subject to remov158
al. Although initially there was some controversy over whether the
program was voluntary or mandatory on the part of local, state, and
federal criminal jurisdictions, the program is now active in every ju159
risdiction in the United States.
Perhaps most transformative to the enforcement regime, however,
was the creation of “287(g)” programs, authorized in IIRIRA. So
termed because they are described in section 287(g) of the INA,
agreements under these programs provide for state and local enforcement entities to receive “delegated authority for immigration
160
enforcement.” The program contains requirements for officer par161
162
ticipation, and provides for a four-week training program.
This explicit delegation of authority erased any question of
whether local agencies could enforce civil immigration law. To clarify this shift in enforcement, the Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel issued a memorandum finding that state and local law enforcement were not preempted from enforcing the civil aspects of
163
This memorandum modified the 1989 memoimmigration law.
randum issued by the same department which had indicated these
164
agencies were preempted from enforcing immigration law.
156

157
158
159
160
161
162
163

164

In 2002, the enforcement and benefits branches of the former Immigration and Naturalization Service were folded into the new Department of Homeland Security. Homeland
Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–296, 116 Stat. 2135. The new benefits branch was
named the Citizenship and Immigration Service, while enforcement was divided into
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (for internal operations) and Customs and Border Protection (for border operations). Id. The immigration court system remained under the Department of Justice.
Secure
Communities,
U.S.
IMMIGRATION
AND
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/secure_communities/ (last visited Apr. 4, 2015).
Id.
Secure Communities Activated Jurisdictions, US IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
(Jan. 22, 2013) (on file with author).
Delegation of Immigration Authority Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S.
IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Feb. 24, 2014), http://www.ice.gov/287g/.
Requirements include: US citizenship, a federal background investigation, one year experience as a law enforcement officer, and no pending disciplinary actions. Id.
The training program is held at the Federal Law Enforcement Training ICE Academy.
Id.
Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, to
the Attorney General (Apr. 3, 2002) (regarding non-preemption of the authority of state
and local law enforcement officials to arrest aliens for immigration violations).
See Kmiec, supra note 151.

May 2015]

SUPPRESSION IN IMMIGRATION PROCEEDINGS

1421

Despite the training programs for both 287(g) officers and local
agents participating in the Secure Communities program, localities
around the country have reported widespread racial profiling is165
Sheriff Joe Arpaio in Arizona is an example often cited for
sues.
166
Initially under the auspices of a section 287(g)
this proposition.
agreement, Sheriff Arpaio instituted practices such as targeting Latino neighborhoods for raids and discriminating against Latinos at ve167
Although Sheriff Arpaio is a fairly extreme exhicle checkpoints.
ample, jurisdictions that participate in these programs nevertheless
168
“have abnormally high rates of non-criminal deportations.” In addi165

166

167

168

Faces of Racial Profiling, RIGHTS WORKING GROUP 1 (Sept. 2010). Despite being forced to
comply with the program, officials in Massachusetts and New York, including the governors of those states, are opposed to Secure Communities, citing encouragement of racial
profiling and eroded trust in law enforcement. Julia Preston, Despite Opposition, Immigration Agency to Expand Fingerprint Program, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/12/us/ice-to-expand-secure-communities-programin-mass-and-ny.html?_r=0.
See generally Memorandum from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights
Division to William R. Jones, Jr., Counsel for Maricopa County Sheriffy’s Office, Re: United States’ Investigation of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, at 5–6 (Dec. 15, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf; Steven
W. Bender, Gringo Alley, 454 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1925, 1935 (2012); Tom Gaynor, Joe Arpaio
to Fight Racial Profiling Monitor Ruling, THE HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 1, 2013),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/11/01/joe-arpaio-racial-profiling_n_
4195208.html. When faced with the controversy, DHS initially required him to sign a
“watered-down” version in 2009. When this failed to curb his actions, DHS was eventually
forced to withdraw the agreement altogether in 2011. Jeremy Duda, Homeland Security Revokes 287(g) Agreements in Arizona, ARIZ. CAPITOL TIMES (June 25, 2012),
http://azcapitoltimes.com/news/2012/06/25/homeland-security-revokes-287gimmigration-check-agreements-in-arizona/.
Memorandum from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division to
William R. Jones, Jr., Counsel for Maricopa County Sheriffy’s Office, Re: United States’
Investigation of the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office, 6–9 (Dec. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso_findletter_12-15-11.pdf. Sheriff
Arpaio’s actions eventually led to a finding of racial profiling by the DOJ Civil Division, a
revocation of the 287(g) agreement by ICE, and class action lawsuit. Id.; see also
Melendres v. Arpaio, 989 F. Supp. 2d 822, 902 (D. Ariz. 2013); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t
of Homeland Sec., Statement by Secretary Janet Napolitano on DOJ’s Findings of Discriminatory Policing in Maricopa County (Dec. 15, 2011), http://www.dhs.gov/
news/2011/12/15/secretary-napolitano-dojs-findings-discriminatory-policing-maricopacounty; Faces of Racial Profiling, RIGHTS WORKING GROUP 6, (Sept. 2010).
NAT’L COMMUNITY ADVISORY REPORT, RESTORING COMMUNITY, 10 (2011). The national
average for noncriminal deportation is 29%. Some jurisdictions are reporting rates as
high as 50%. There is also a plethora of information about decreasing arrest rates for
criminal charges and rising response times that immigration advocates allege have occurred since the institution of 287(g) in some jurisdictions. For instance, arrest rates
plunged from a 10.5% rate in 2005 pre-287(g) to 2.5% in 2007 in Maricopa County. Andrea Nill, What Happens When Local Cops Become Immigration Agents?, IMMIGRATION POLICY
CENTER (Aug. 6, 2008), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/what-happenswhen-local-cops-become-immigration-agents.
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tion, some of these jurisdictions report a high rate of arrest for minor
crimes for racial minorities despite the fact that these programs are
169
The high rate of
created to capture serious criminal offenders.
noncriminal deportations coupled with the increased numbers of arrests for minor traffic violations in jurisdictions using 287(g) and Secure Communities has led some commentators to surmise that these
programs create an incentive for local police officers to profile mi170
norities outside of the criminal context.
In addition to potential racial profiling issues, other studies have
found that ICE enforcement demonstrates a pattern and practice of
171
The increase in claims of Fourth
Fourth Amendment violations.
Amendment violations has prompted a corresponding increase in
172
scholarly commentary about the issue.
C. Individual Deterrent Effect
The last major issue that the Court noted in Lopez-Mendoza as a
factor that reduced the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule in
immigration proceedings was the effect of deterrence on individual
173
The Immigration and Naturalization Service
immigration agents.

169
170

171

172

173

Faces of Racial Profiling, supra note 165 at 6–7.
See id. at 6, 38–39; CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, Rights Groups Release Documents from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Agency FOIA Lawsuit
(Aug. 10, 2010); Trevor Gardner II and Aarti Kohi, The C.A.P. Effect: Racial Profiling in the
ICE Criminal Alien Program, THE CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN INSTITUTE ON RACE,
ETHNICITY, AND DIVERSITY 8 (Sept. 2009) (finding that the institution of the C.A.P. program in Irvine, Texas, resulted in a substantial rise in traffic arrests and arrests for petty
misdemeanor offenses); Under Siege: Life for Low-Income Latinos in the South, SOUTHERN
POVERTY LAW CENTER 2 (Apr. 2009) (describing various methods of racial profiling including roadblocks in predominantly Latino areas but citing to lack of data and refusal to
respond for requests for information by localities as a common cause of lack of substantial evidence of racial profiling); Deborah M. Weissman, et al., The Policies and Politics of
Local Immigration Enforcement Laws: 287(g) Program in North Carolina, AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF NORTH CAROLINA LEGAL FOUNDATION 29–29 (Feb. 2009) (discussing
targeting minorities in traffic stops and the vast resources transferred to capture people
under 287(g)); RESTORING COMMUNITY, supra note 168, at 7 (citing Chris Burbank, Chief
of Police for Salt Lake City).
Brief for Oliva-Ramos as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney
General of the United States, 694 F.3d 259 (3d Cir. 2012) (No. 10–3849); Bess Chiu, et
al., Constitution on ICE: A Report on Immigration Home Raid Operations, CARDOZO
IMMIGRATION JUSTICE CLINIC 3 (2009).
Stella Burch Elias, “Good Reason to Believe”: Widespread Constitutional Violations in the
Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008
WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1112 (2009); see also Brief for Maria Argueta as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Maria Argueta v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 643 F.3d 60
(3d Cir. 2011) (No. 10–1479).
See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984).
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did not regularly publish statistical information related to arrests,
cases, and dispositions during the period prior to the 1984 Lopez174
Mendoza decision. However, from the information provided in both
the Supreme Court’s opinion and the briefs by both parties, some information related to the percentage of arrests per individual agent
can be extrapolated.
In 1983, the estimated number of deportable aliens apprehended
175
was 1,106,683. From that information, the Lopez-Mendoza Court determined, given the rate of apprehension and number of INS agents,
that each INS agent apprehended approximately 500 individuals per
176
One would therefore estimate that approximately 2,213
year.
agents were active in the field during this time frame.
Of the individuals arrested per year during the early 1980s, 97.5%
agreed to voluntary departure, meaning that they chose not to exer177
Accise their right to a hearing and voluntarily left the country.
cordingly, roughly 27,667 individuals sought either to contest the
grounds of their deportation or seek relief before an immigration
judge. In contrast, only a negligible number of arrestees would even
see a courtroom: for each agent, only twelve out of the 500 arrested.
Compare the 1983 statistics to those from 2012. In 2012, the
number of aliens apprehended by immigration enforcement was only
178
643,474. Although it is unclear how many arrests each immigration
enforcement agent made, the initial assessment below will use the
number of individuals each agency employs. There were approxi179
180
mately 21,000 Border Patrol agents, over 20,000 ICE employees,
174

175
176
177
178
179

The Department of Homeland Security now houses the archives for the then-INS. YearDEPARTMENT
OF
HOMELAND
SECURITY,
book
of
Immigration
Statistics,
http://www.dhs.gov/yearbook-immigration-statistics (last visited Apr. 4, 2015). The author found Statistical Yearbooks dating back to 1996, but no consistent source for prior
years. Since that time, however, INS, now DHS, has maintained detailed information in
their annual Statistical Yearbook. Id. The adjudication branch of then-INS, now EOIR,
maintains historical Statistical Yearbooks dating back to 2000. Id. Further, the statistical
information cited in the Lopez-Mendoza opinion referred to information provided by the
INS in appellate briefs rather than independent reports. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044.
U.S. Gov’t of Accountability Office, Immigration: An Issue Analysis of an Emerging Problem (Sept. 1985).
Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1044 (citing Lopez-Mendoza v. INS., 705 F.2d 1059, 1071 n.17);
Petitioner’s Brief at 38.
Id.
Enforcement Actions, 2012 YEARBOOK IMMIGR. STAT. (DEP’T. HOMELAND SEC.) 91, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/publication/yearbook-2012.
Boots on the Ground or Eyes in the Sky: How Best to Utilize the National Guard to
Achieve Operational Control: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Border and Maritime
Security of the H. Comm. On Homeland Security, 112th Cong. 16 (2012) (prepared
statement of R. Vitiello, Deputy Chief of U.S. Customs and Border Protection Office, and
Martin Vaughan, Exec. Dir. of Office of Air and Marine Southwest Border Operations).
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and 1,500 officers trained and certified by under the 287(g) pro181
In the same year, 410,753 cases were initiated in the immigram.
182
Of those, 317,930 moved forward to a full heargration court.
183
ing, while 26,635 immediately forwent proceedings and opted for
184
Put in this way, the numbers demonstrate
voluntary departure.
that arrests per agent have drastically decreased since 1983, and the
number of voluntary departure cases has significantly decreased.
Year
Apprehensions
Agents
Arrests per Agent
Cases
Voluntary Departures
Percent Voluntary Departure

1984
1,106,683
2,213
500
27,667
1,079,016
97.5%

185

2012
643,474
42,300
15
410,753
186
259,356
40%

To be fair, it is clear that not every employee in ICE and CBP are
active agents in the field; however, even if only 50% of employees are

180
181
182
183
184

185

186

Occupations,
U.S.
IMMIGRATION
AND
CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT,
http://www.ice.gov/careers/occupations (last visited Feb. 10, 2015).
Fact Sheet: Updated Facts on ICE’s 287(g) Program, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
(June 18, 2013), http://www.ice.gov/news/library/factsheets/287g-reform.htm.
Executive Office for Immigration Review, FY 2012 Statistical Year Book B2 fig.1. (2013)
[hereinafter EOIR 2012 Year Book].
EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK B4 tbl.1A. The remaining types of cases are divided into bonds
(78,065) and motions (14,758). Id.
EOIR 2012 YEAR BOOK Q1 tbl.15. It should be noted that these numbers are not completely compatible. It would be impossible to determine what percentage of the cases actually received in 2012 resulted in voluntary departure because statistics on specific cases
are not published in the Year Book. However, the number of voluntary departure decisions per year tends to hover around 26,000 for each of the past five years presented in
the table.
The Department of Homeland Security and Executive Office for Immigration Review
provide annual Statistical Yearbooks. Although EOIR has a 2013 update, the most recent
data for DHS is in 2012. In order to maintain consistency in numbers, all data was pulled
from the 2012 yearbooks for both agencies. In addition, statistical information provided
by the agencies in recent years provide similar outcomes. See generally EOIR STATISTICS
YEARBOOKS,
http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/syb2000main.htm;
DEPARTMENT
OF
HOMELAND SECURITY, Yearbook of Immigration Statistics, http://www.dhs.gov/yearbookimmigration-statistics.
Number was derived from adding the number of voluntary departure orders issued plus
the difference between the number of individuals apprehended and the number of cases
initiated.
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responsible for arrests, the number of arrests per agent is still a dras187
tic decrease from that in 1983.
One could argue that the use of state and local enforcement officers actually decreases the deterrent effect in a traditional sense be188
cause they are not vested in the civil immigration proceedings.
However, 287(g) agents are agents of ICE for the purposes of enforcement; they have a memorandum of understanding, and there is
some level of training through the federal programs. To the extent
that they are operating under both criminal and civil law, they cannot
pick and choose which one they are at a given moment. By acting as
agents of both, the agents become vested in both the criminal and
civil aspects of the arrest.
III. THE CONVERGENCE OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
Fourth Amendment case law has also continued to evolve since
Lopez-Mendoza. The Supreme Court has increased the types of exceptions to search warrants in a shift towards concern for safety of both
189
enforcement officers and the public. As the number of search warrant exceptions has grown, the Court has also reduced the impact of
190
In fact, some commentators have sounded
the exclusionary rule.
the death knell for the exclusionary rule as an option to redress
191
Section A of this Part reviews the
Fourth Amendment violations.
historical use of the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings,
and then discusses how each circuit has addressed the “widespread
violations and egregiousness” language of the Lopez-Mendoza plurality.
Section B gives a brief overview of the development of the exclusionary rule in the criminal context.

187

188

189

190
191

Even if only half of the employees are active agents, there would only be 30 arrests per
agent. Another interesting way to view the data is that even if only 287(g) program
agents were involved in the apprehensions, the number of arrests per agent would still be
below 500 (494).
The Eighth Circuit tangentially addressed this issue in Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder, finding that
the deterrent effect would be too attenuated, however that was not in the context of
287(g). 653 F.3d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 2011). The Court noted that there was no evidence
that the state officer “acted solely on behalf of the United States.” Id.
Rather than a presumption of a constitutional violation, the Supreme Court has moved
towards a balancing analysis. Alec Rice, Note, Brave New Circuit: Creeping Towards DNA
Database Dystopia in U.S. v. Weikert, 14 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 691, 699–709 (2009).
Slobogin, supra note 25, at 343.
Id.
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A. The State of the Exclusionary Rule in Immigration Court
The lower court in Lopez-Mendoza noted that since 1899, there
were only two cases in which suppression was applied; and that since
1952, fewer than fifty immigration cases have included a suppression
192
But the history of the Fourth Amendment in immigration
issue.
193
courts is more complex. In early cases, the BIA struggled to determine what role the law of unreasonable search and seizures should
play in immigration proceedings. At first, it relied on an early habeas
corpus claim when finding that individuals were protected by the exclusionary rule, though “possibly to a lesser extent than if this were a
194
Motions to suppress in the immigration
criminal prosecution.”
context at that time often relied on one of two theories: INS agents

192

193

194

Lopez-Mendoza v. INS, 705 F.2d 1059, 1071 (9th Cir. 1983). This claim must be taken in
context. In the immigration court system, the substance of a claim is not recorded in any
fashion unless it is appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Even once transcribed
and sent to the BIA, there are no statistics related to how many of the cases appearing before the Board raised a suppression claim. Within this structure, on average, only 1–2%
of cases are ever appealed to the BIA, resulting in the substance of a case coming to light.
Of those, only .1–.15% are actually published. The result is that out of the nearly 250,000
cases completed annually by the immigration court, only an average of thirty to forty lead
to published cases, about .01–.02% of all immigration cases. On average that means of
the approximately 250,000 cases per year that the BIA hears, only thirty to forty cases will
be published. In 1984, only thirty-one cases were published within the BIA.
Rebecca Chiao, Fourth Amendment Limits on Immigration Law Enforcement, 92–3 IMMIGR.
BRIEFINGS 20 (Feb. 1992). By the time of the 1984 Lopez-Mendoza decision, the Supreme
Court had already begun to erode application of the Fourth Amendment in immigrationrelated criminal cases. United States v. Jackson, 825 F.2d 853, 865 (5th Cir. 1987) (limiting the application at the border and its equivalent); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (allowing for fixed check-points absent reasonable suspicion).
Although beyond the scope of this Article, it is noteworthy that the Supreme Court has issued several decisions impacting the relationship between the Fourth Amendment and
immigration-related issues. For instance, the Court noted that although the INA sets out
standards for the ability to question and search aliens based on civil immigration issues,
they are still tempered by the requirements in the Fourth Amendment. Almeida-Sanchez
v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 273 (1973). A large source of these cases surround the
definition of the “border” and factors to take into account in determining reasonable
suspicion of illegal entry. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 885–87 (1975).
In re D-M-, 6 I&N Dec. 726, 730 (BIA 1955) (citing United States ex rel. Bilokumsky v. Tod,
263 U.S. 149 (1923)). It should be noted here that the Bilokumsky case was a landmark
for civil immigration cases in several ways. Not only did the case, at least provisionally,
address the use of the exclusionary rule in deportation proceedings, the case also addressed several issues comparing the civil-based immigration proceeding to criminal cases. Bilokumsky, 263 U.S. at 153–57. The Court first noted that there is no equivalent of
the presumption of innocence (or presumption of citizenship) that there is in criminal
cases. Id. at 154. Further, the Court noted that the there is nothing preventing a tribunal
from drawing an adverse inference from an individual claiming the Fifth Amendment
right against self-incrimination. Id. Lastly the Court found that the rule excluding involuntary confessions had no application in the civil immigration proceedings. Id. at 157.
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either violated the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unlawful
search and seizure, or they violated regulatory provisions of the
195
INA.
Under the first theory, the BIA often applied a criminal law analysis to determine whether an unreasonable search and seizure had oc196
Although some of the cases followed the criminal analysis
curred.
through to the end, many of them found application of the exclusionary rule unnecessary because any unlawful activity did not affect
197
In other instances, the BIA rested
the case’s ultimate disposition.
its decision not on an analysis of an unreasonable search and seizure,
198
but rather on the regulatory scheme of the INA. As with claims under the Fourth Amendment, motions to suppress under the regulatory scheme were rarely granted, although for different reasons; in these cases, the threshold for allowing a stop is so low that most
199
warrantless law enforcement conduct easily passed muster.
Since the Lopez-Mendoza decision, lower court analysis of when and
whether to apply the exclusionary rule has changed. Largely to
blame is the language in Part V of Justice O’Connor’s opinion, which
suggested the propriety of exclusion in the context of “egregious violations of the Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental fairness and undermine the probative

195

196

197

198

199

See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, The Law of Arrest,
Search, and Seizure for Immigration Officers, Manual No. M–69, at II–4 (1993) (explaining the law regarding civil arrests).
In In re Lennon, the BIA, somewhat belatedly given the number of cases that had already
been heard on the merits, confirmed that motions to suppress can be heard in a quasijudicial hearings like the immigration court. 15 I&N Dec. 9, 12 (BIA 1974). While many
cases, such as In re Doo, addressed the substantive analysis of whether there was an unlawful search and seizure, the majority of the published cases tackled the more procedural
question of the burden of proof. 13 I&N Dec. 30, 31–32 (BIA 1968). In re Tang settled
once and for all that the respondent must support a motion to suppress with proof that
establishes a prima facie case before the burden shifts to the INS to justify the manner in
which the evidence was obtained, explicitly borrowing the test from criminal law analysis.
13 I&N Dec. 691, 692 (BIA 1971).
For example, in In re Gonzalez, the respondent argued that he was illegally arrested, and
thus the proceedings against him were unlawful. 16 I&N Dec. 44, 45 (BIA 1976). However, respondent had already admitted to his identity, and his wife testified that the application with the necessary information related to alienage and grounds of deportation was
his, corroborating the government’s assertion of his deportability. Id. at 46.
In re Au is the first case to discuss the interaction between the two analyses. 13 I&N Dec.
294, 299–300 (BIA 1969). As noted in that case, often the two theories must often be
viewed at the same time. Id. What may be found to be unlawful under the Fourth
Amendment may pass muster under the INA § 287(a)(1), which allows a much broader
range of activities with a lower burden on agents for searches and seizures.
Id. at 300 (“A suspicion can be [a] reasonable one if no more appears than that the person approached is in an area in which illegal aliens are found.”).
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value of the evidence obtained . . . ”; application of that specific lan200
guage has caused a circuit split.
Four circuits (the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits) have
not taken up the issue directly, although they have recognized, to
some degree, that the language of the plurality may have some force.
Neither the Fourth nor Fifth Circuit has specifically addressed
whether they recognize Justice O’Connor’s so-called “egregious exception.” Moreover, neither circuit has explained what would actually constitute egregiousness; rather, both circuits confusingly have case
law that omit the egregiousness language and case law that cite to it—
201
sometimes in the very same case. The Tenth Circuit lacks cases that
discuss exclusion solely within the Fourth Amendment context but in
one case it did mention the prohibition on the use of the rule in im202
migration proceedings.
The Seventh Circuit has flirted with the possibility of applying the
egregiousness exception. In most cases discussing the prohibition,
the Court has cited to the Justice O’Connor’s exception, and notes
that the court “left open the possibility” that the rule “may apply” if
203
Indeed, in one case, the Seventh
there are egregious violations.
Circuit actually went through an analysis of whether the conduct in
question actually rose to the level of egregiousness, but found that it
204
involved mere minor physical abuse and aggressive questioning. In
a recent criminal sentencing case, however, the court showed less inclination to use the exception when dismissing an argument for an
200

201

202
203

204

INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050–51 (1984. Compare United States v. Sanders,
743 F.3d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 2014) (dismissing the exception in the criminal sentencing
context as a reserved question rather than a holding) with Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d
1441, 1448 (9th Cir. 1994) (applying the test to find a racially-based stop falls under the
egregious constitutional violation exception).
Initially, the Fourth Circuit indicated that it need not consider egregious violations; however, a later Fourth Circuit decision states that “Lopez-Mendoza establishes that the exclusionary rule does not apply in civil deportation proceedings.” United States v. OscarTorres, 507 F.3d 224, 230 (4th Cir. 2007). But see Mineo v. INS, 19 F.3d 11, 1994 WL
65051, at *2 (4th Cir. Feb. 24, 1994) (assuming that the exclusionary rule applied where
there were “egregious constitutional violations” that would render the evidence “fundamentally unfair.”). See also Odukwe v. INS, 977 F.2d 573 (Table), 1992 WL 301941, at *1
(4th Cir. Oct. 22, 1992). The Fifth Circuit has noted the exception in several unpublished cases, but not in the one published case on the issue. Santos v. Holder, 506 F.
App’x 263, 264 (5th Cir. 2013); Escobar v. Holder, 398 F. App’x 50, 54 (5th Cir. 2010);
Gonzalez-Reyes v. Holder, 313 F. App’x 690, 695 (5th Cir. 2009); Mendoza-Solis v. INS, 36
F.3d 12, 14 (5th Cir. 1994).
United States v. Olivares-Rangel, 458 F.3d 1104, 1115 n.9 (10th Cir. 2006).
Gutierrez-Berdin v. Holder, 618 F.3d 647, 652 (7th Cir. 2010) (emphasis added); see also
Wroblewska v. Holder, 656 F.3d 473, 477–78 (7th Cir. 2011); Krasilych v. Holder, 583 F.3d
962, 967 (7th Cir. 2009).
Gutierrez-Berdin, 618 F.3d at 652.
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exception in the sentencing context. It therefore held that although
the court “reserved decision” on the exception, it said only “we have
205
explained why reserving a question does not equal a holding[.]”
Two circuits have adopted Justice O’Connor’s exception but have
yet to apply it. The Sixth Circuit, for example, follows the exception
206
but has not applied it or defined what constitutes “egregious.” The
First Circuit has similarly adopted the exception, but has not ex207
plained what “egregiousness” means.
Four circuits take a wider view of Justice O’Connor’s exception by
208
both adopting and applying egregiousness. The Second Circuit, for
instance, discussed the egregious exception in several cases that
fleshed out the analysis, allowing for suppression in situations that
amount to a Fourth Amendment violation in addition to a court209
In doing so, the Court read the Lopezdefined aggravated factor.
Mendoza plurality opinion to allow for exclusion where either (1) the
violation created a fundamentally unfair situation, or (2) the viola210
tion undermined the reliability of the evidence. The court assesses

205
206

207

208

209
210

United States v. Sanders, 743 F.3d 471, 473 (7th Cir. 2014).
The Sixth Circuit explicitly recognized the exception in United States v. Navarro-Diaz, 420
F.3d 581, 587 (6th Cir. 2005) (The Supreme Court qualified its holding when it stated in
the last paragraph of Lopez-Mendoza that “we do not deal here with egregious violations of
the Fourth Amendment or other liberties that might transgress notions of fundamental
fairness” (quoting INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1050 (1984)). However, it was
not necessary in that case to discuss what the meaning of “egregious” in this context
means. Id. (explaining that in Lopez-Mendoza the cases highlighted by the court were
clearly egregious). It should further be noted that despite this recognition, lower courts
in the Sixth Circuit have still failed to apply the exception. United States v. Wellons, No.
05–80810, 2013 WL 357831 at *2 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 29, 2013) (finding that the Sixth Circuit has not recognized the exception).
The Court initially recognized the exception in Navarro-Chalan v. Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 19,
22–23 (1st Cir. 2004) (recognizing the exclusionary rule). Although the circuit has noted
the exception in one other published case, it has not expounded upon the initial recognition. Kandamar v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 65, 70 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying the egregious
exclusion).
It is important to note that this line of cases maintains that, while the characterization of
Part V is technically correct in that only four of the five majority Justices joined in that
section, since the remaining four Justices dissented on the premise that the exclusionary
rule should apply without restriction, a full eight Justices agreed with the premise that the
exclusionary rule should apply in cases involving widespread violations or in egregious
circumstances. See Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney General, 694 F.3d 259, 271, 274–75 (3d Cir.
2012) (explaining that all eight Justices thought that the exclusionary rule should apply
in deportation proceedings involving egregious violations); Puc-Ruiz v. Holder, 629 F.3d
771, 778 n.2 (8th Cir. 2010).
Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 462 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006); Cotzojay v. Holder, 725
F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2013); Pretzantzin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 2013).
Almeida-Amaral v. Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006). The court noted that although the Supreme Court used the conjunctive “and” when discussing these violations,
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both scenarios on a case-by-cases basis by considering four factors:
intentionality of violation; whether the seizure was gross or unreasonable; evidence of threats, coercion, physical abuse, or unreasonable
shows of force; and whether the arrest or seizure was based on race or
211
ethnicity.
212
AltThe Third Circuit follows the Second Circuit’s analysis.
213
hough the Eighth Circuit initially adopted the Second Circuit’s test,
recent Eighth Circuit cases call into question whether it would apply
214
the Second Circuit’s egregiousness test.
The most expansive view for the egregious exception is in the
215
Ninth Circuit. In evaluating egregiousness, the court contemplates
whether the “evidence [was] obtained by deliberate violations of the
Fourth Amendment, or by conduct a reasonable officer should have
216
This wide view asknown is in violation of the Constitution . . . .”
sesses whether a violation exists and, if so, moves on to considering
whether there was a degree of culpability in the conduct of the of217
ficer.

211

212
213
214

215
216
217

because the Court cited to two separate lines of cases, it intended to use the disjunctive
“or,” creating two separate areas in which the exclusionary rule can be applied. Id. at 234.
Cotzojay v. Holder, 725 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court noted that there are no
hard and fast rules related to these factors: On one hand the test is not so concrete as to
require any of the factors (such as physical force); on the other, certain factors do not create a per se presumption of a factor (a home invasion, for instance, would require additional factors to demonstrate fundamental unfairness). Id at 182–83; Pretzantzin v. Holder, 736 F.3d 641, 646 (2d Cir. 2013); Oliva-Ramos v. Attorney General, 694 F.3d 259, 278–
79 (3d Cir. 2012)
Oliva-Ramos, 694 F.3d at 278.
Puc-Ruiz, 629 F.3d at 778–79 (applying the egregiousness exception).
Since its 2010 decision, the Court has consistently used language to distance itself from
an express adoption of the egregious exception. Lopez-Gabriel v. Holder 653 F.3d 683,
686 (8th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he application of the exclusionary rule to an immigration case
involving such violations has not been resolved in this circuit.”); Lopez-Fernandez v.
Holder, 735 F.3d 1043, 1046 (8th Cir. 2013) (“We need not decide today whether to join
other circuits in holding that an egregious Fourth Amendment violation affirmatively
compels exclusion in a removal proceeding because the Petitioners have not alleged an
egregious violation”).
Gonzalez-Rivera v. INS, 22 F.3d 1441, 1448–49 (9th Cir. 1994) (explaining that all bad
faith actions require the exclusionary rule in civil cases).
Id. at 1448.
Although all cases in the two decades since Gonzalez-Rivera have recognized the exception,
there has been some criticism of the line of reasoning. See e.g. Lopez-Rodriguez v. Holder, 560 F.3d 1098, 1100 (9th Cir. 2009) (denying rehearing en banc) (Bea, J., dissenting
(with O’Scannlain, Tallman, Bybee, & Callahan, JJ.) (stating that the line of cases erred
first in bifurcating the egregious exception, and second by focusing on the knowledge of
officers rather than their conduct)).
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B. The Exclusionary Rule in Criminal Proceedings
Since its creation, the exclusionary rule has garnered many critics
who argue that the result of exclusion—freeing guilty defendants—is
too great a consequence for a Fourth Amendment violation. In addition, opponents argue that the main rationale for the rule, to deter
officer malfeasance, is not a sufficient basis to justify its grave conse218
quences.
After the Supreme Court’s decision in Mapp v. Ohio to apply the
exclusionary rule to the states, the rule increasingly became the sub219
Through a series of cases in the
ject of Supreme Court litigation.
1970s, the Court both steadily eroded the substance of the warrant
220
requirement by creating several exceptions, and simultaneously be221
gan to limit application of the exclusionary rule.
Scholars and the judiciary alike have revisited use of the exclu222
sionary rule as a remedial measure in the decades since Mapp.
Scholars have, for example, noted that changing jurisprudence surrounding the use of the exclusionary rule is now properly viewed in
223
light of the purpose of the remedy. Early cases saw citation to high
218

219
220

221

222
223

Tonja Jacobi, The Law and Economics of the Exclusionary Rule, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585,
652–53 (2011); Richard E. Meyers II, Fourth Amendment Small Claims Court, 10 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 571, 574 (2013); L. Timothy Perrin et al., If It’s Broken, Fix It: Moving Beyond the
Exclusionary Rule, 83 IOWA L. REV. 669, 671 (1998).
Slobogin, supra note 25, at 346 (explaining a string of Supreme Court decisions).
Among the most notable of these include the development of the Terry stop (allowing
for a brief stop and frisk if conduct leads an officer to reasonably believe that criminal activity may be afoot, that there is a weapon, and that the individual is presently dangerous), and approval of discretionless checkpoints, including those for checking immigration status. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25–26 (1968); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543, 563 (1976). Exceptions to the warrant requirement for both searches and seizures are numerous. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 706 (1983) (allowing for exigent circumstances); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (holding that
there is no requirement to demonstrate individual knew of right to withhold consent to
search); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 156 (1925) (creating the automobile exception).
In fact, 1984, the same year as the Lopez-Mendoza case, saw three major cases limiting the
exclusionary rule in the criminal realm including the good faith rule, inevitable discovery, and the later-obtained warrant exception. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 920
(1984) (adopting a good faith rule); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444 (1984) (adopting
an inevitable discovery exception to the exclusionary rule), Segura v. United States, 468
U.S. 796, 810 (1984) (adopting a later-obtained warrant exception to the exclusionary
rule).
Keith A. Fabi, The Exclusionary Rule: Not the “Expressed Juice of the Wolly-Headed
Thistle,” 35 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 942 (1986).
Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”: The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 47, 50–52 (2010) (examining the history of the rule from the perspective of a remedy); Scott E. Sundby & Lucy B. Ricca, The Majestic and the Mundane: The Two Creation Stories of the Exclusionary Rule,
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ideals related to “judicial integrity” in urging the importance of con224
Jurissequences being attached to Fourth Amendment violations.
prudence, however, evolved to viewing the exclusionary rule as a “ju225
dicially created remedy”. In fact, Lopez-Mendoza and its forerunner,
Janis, were both part of a larger change in analysis seen in the
226
These cases, analyzing the application of the rule in non1980s.
criminal cases, focus on a sterile analysis of the likelihood of deterrence and social costs, rather than the overarching principle of ensur227
ing “judicial integrity.”
Application of the exclusionary rule by the Supreme Court steadily decreased during the 1990s and early 2000s. Then came Herring v.
United States in 2009, which held that the exclusionary rule would not
provide a sufficient level of deterrence for mistakes made by the po228
lice as a result of negligence. Although some view the holding narrowly, scholars have opined that the subsequent case of Davis v. Unit229
ed States points to a more broad reading. In a review of past cases,
230
The
the Court focused on the conduct of the officers in each case.

224

225

226

227
228
229

230

43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 391, 394 (2010) (explaining the history of the rule); Thomas K.
Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Right, 10 OHIO ST. J.
CRIM. L. 357, 366 (2013) (explaining the post-Mapp debate about the purpose of the
rule).
Two cases most often cited for containing language to the constitutionality of the rule
and to judicial integrity are Weeks and Mapp. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393
(1914) (referring frequently to the Constitution); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660
(1961) (emphasizing judicial integrity). These two cases embody the original theory of
the exclusionary rule. Robert M. Bloom & David H. Fentin, “A More Majestic Conception”:
The Importance of Judicial Integrity in Preserving the Exclusionary Rule, 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L.
47, 50–53 (2010).
Language describing the rule as a judicially created remedy, rather than a matter of judicial integrity, was first seen in United States v. Calandra. 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (“[T]he
rule is a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the party
aggrieved.”). This shift in focus allowed the Court to move the analysis away from enforcing a constitutional right to making a determination of whether exclusion would exact a
strong enough “punishment” to deter misconduct by police. See Clancy, supra note 223,
at 389.
The 1984 case of United States v. Leon saw the first inception of the “good faith” doctrine
that now dominates exclusionary rule jurisprudence. 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984). As with
Lopez-Mendoza, Leon saw the Court move towards an analysis of a balancing test of deterrence and social costs. Id. at 910.
See Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in which she refers to “a more majestic conception” of the
Fourth Amendment. Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 151 (2009).
Id. at 145 (applying an objective deterrence analysis).
131 S. Ct. 2419, 2423–24 (2011) (holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply when
a search is based on an objectively reasonable reliance on appellate precedent); see Clancy, supra note 223, at 378 (arguing that Davis gave wide applicability to the rule established in Herring).
Herring, 555 U.S. at 143–44.
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majority opinion then summarized the exclusionary rule application
as “serv[ing] to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent con231
duct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.”
Thus, the Court broadened the social cost versus deterrence analysis
by moving from focusing on whether there was an objective good
232
faith error, to determining whether an officer was negligent.
Two years later, the Court had occasion to assess the exclusionary
233
Unlike the officer in Herring,
rule again in Davis v. United States.
who relied on an erroneous police database, the officer in Davis was
relying on circuit court precedent allowing for searches of vehicles
234
after arrest. The Supreme Court later found such searches to be a
violation of the Fourth Amendment when the arrestee is not within
235
reaching distance of the vehicle, but the Court in Davis held that
because the search was initially conducted in “objectively reasonable
reliance” on appellate precedent, the exclusionary rule would not de236
In doing so, the Court
ter future Fourth Amendment violations.
reinforced the culpability standard set out in Herring, focusing not
only on deterrence and societal costs, but wrapping the deterrence
side of the test in a cloak of culpability and objective reasonable237
ness.
CONCLUSION
Given the significant changes in both immigration proceedings
and enforcement since the decision in Lopez-Mendoza, the Supreme
Court’s concern about keeping immigration proceedings “simple” to
enable swift adjudication in an administrative court no longer holds
weight. Immigration proceedings have become increasingly complex
as a result of changes to the structure of the proceedings, as well as to
238
Furthe substance of grounds of deportation and forms of relief.
ther, the widespread use of state and local law enforcement for immigration purposes has altered both the number of agents enforcing
immigration and decreased the amount of oversight for these agents.

231
232
233
234
235
236
237
238

Id. at 150–51 (citations omitted).
Shima Baradaran, Rebalancing the Fourth Amendment, 102 GEO. L.J. 1, 13 n.65–66 (2013).
131 S. Ct. 2419 (2011).
Id. at 2426.
Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 351 (2009).
Davis, 131 S. Ct. at 2434.
Id. at 2429.
Indeed, the Court’s decision in Lopez-Mendoza has actually led to further complication of
the court system, as evidenced by the numerous circuit court opinions devoting significant amounts of published cases to the issue.
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In addition, because the development of exclusionary rule case
law in the criminal and immigration context have, in application,
been converging towards a similar theme of requiring a level of egregiousness, the Court should apply the exclusionary rule in immigration proceedings precisely as it is already constructed in criminal
courts. The decisions in Herring and Davis, which focused on the balancing of costs and deterrence, coupled with a focus on the culpability of the enforcement agent, mirrors exactly the approach the Ninth
Circuit has used in the immigration context. A consistent approach
to the exclusionary rule in both contexts would centralize the analysis
and allow for consistent application in the immigration context.

